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Abstract
This paper presents the concept of “genocide discourses”, defined as a type of strategic narrative that shapes the way
individuals and groups position themselves and others and act, playing a critical role in the production of violence and
efforts to reduce it. Genocide discourses tend to present genocide as fundamentally a-political, and hold that genocidal
systems are dislodged only when they are swept away through external violence. Secondly, genocide discourses are built
on an assumption that the victims of genocide are necessarily moral innocents, not parties in conflict. These two factors
make genocide discourses highly effective in conferring moral capital upon certain actors in a conflict. The two principles
converge to produce strategic narratives that direct political and military actions in certain ways in the context of con-
tentious conflicts and political violence, motivating humanitarian responses in defense of certain groups, or sustaining
popular support for foreign wars. The paper illustrates the argument by examining two case studies between 2014 and
2017: the debates in the United States over Islamic State genocides, and the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
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1. Introduction
When the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine in 2014
and annexed Crimea, accusations of genocide were un-
leashed on all sides of the conflict. Ukrainian national-
ists accused the Soviet Union of committing genocide
against Ukraine in the 1930s and 1940s. The Russian gov-
ernment, in turn, denied the Soviets committed geno-
cide and accused the Ukrainian government of attempt-
ing tomanufacture past Soviet genocides to cover up the
fact that Ukrainian nationalists currently were plotting
genocide against ethnic Russians. Depending onone’s po-
sition in the conflict, therefore, the Russian invasion of
Ukraine is either seen as an effort to save ethnic Rus-
sians from genocide in eastern Ukrainian, or an illegal
military invasion undertaken by a Russian government in
Moscow that claims historical dominance over Ukraine
because of a political arrangement that was achieved by
Stalin through genocide in the 1930s and 1940s.
In another conflict, seemingly a world away, we find
a similar genocide discourse at work. In 2014, the United
States government began to indicate that it was inclined
to determine the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL) was committing genocide (Kerry, 2014).When it be-
came apparent that United States officials would seek to
declare ISIL’s treatment of the Yezidi religiousminority to
be genocide, Christian groups in the United States mobi-
lized to pressure congressional representatives to pres-
sure the State Department to include Christians as vic-
tims of ISIL genocide (Toosi, 2015, 2016). The goals of this
movement, which was in many ways led by the Catholic
organization the Knights of Columbus, were humanitar-
ian and grounded in an authentic impulse to provide re-
lief to those who were suffering, even if this humanitar-
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ian response was rooted in their own politics. The re-
sponse employed a genocide discourse to build sympa-
thy amongst Christian lobby groups in the United States
to pressure the government to expand the number of Syr-
ian and Iraqi refugees (of all religious groups) accepted
by the United States. But this genocide discourse, which
used the suffering of Christians as a bridge for mobilizing
American sympathy to all the victims of ISIL, was quickly
eclipsed by a second, parallel genocide discourse that
presented Islam, and especially Sunni Islam, as a genoci-
dal evil that had to be eradicated. This second genocide
discourse undercut the goals of the first, as humanitarian
sympathy for the victims of ISIL gave way to movements
calling upon Americans to care for the victims of ISIL
by eradicating ISIL, which delegitimized the incipient at-
tempts by Catholic social justice lobby groups to increase
the number of refugees accepted by the United States.
I define “genocide discourse” as a type of strate-
gic narrative, where a strategic narrative is understood
in part as a “compelling story [line] which can explain
events convincingly and from which inferences can be
drawn” (Freedman, 2006, p. 22). Strategic narratives—
whether they are articulated at an interpersonal, inter-
group, national, or inter-national level—shape the way
individuals and groups position themselves and others,
and act (Cobb, 2013, pp. 4–5; Smith, 2003). The infer-
ences that strategic narratives engender play a crucial
role in legitimizing or motivating certain kinds of actions,
creating a set of assumptions about a given conflict that
can prescribe, or even motivate, certain responses or ac-
tions. For instance, to state that a group in a conflict is a
victim of genocide confers upon that group a kind of in-
nocence, helplessness, or defenselessness. This, in turn,
can elicit sympathy to their position, and prescribe cer-
tain actions be undertaken, presumably, in their defense.
Because such actions are inferred, not stated explicitly,
strategic narratives in times of armed conflict can be ef-
ficient movers of public opinion, legitimizing the conflict
and stifling public debate and critical inquiry, while fos-
tering a commonly held perception that the conflict is
not a policy choice of elites and leaders but rather some-
thing unavoidable, even natural. They can also set in mo-
tion reductionist explanations of conflict that elidemean-
ingful distinctions between actors in conflict. This is pre-
cisely what genocide discourses are intended to do—to
collapse the social, political, economic, cultural, religious,
and historical contexts of any conflict into a simple binary
of good guys and bad guys. By explaining conflicts in bi-
nary terms, genocide narratives can bolster exclusionist
rhetoric, crystalizing positions in a conflict, or responses
to a conflict, in unequivocal terms (Feierstein, 2013).
Strategic narratives can be transnational, adopted
and adapted by groups, in reference to local responses
to local politics or global politics. As such, they can be
“global narratives” that “criss-cross the world” and “play
a critical role in the production of violence, as well as in
the international policies and practices that seek to con-
tain or reduce it” (Cobb, 2013, p. 4). This was the case,
for example, in a global interplay that occurred as local
Catholic groups around the world began to advocate for
humanitarian policy responses in defense of the victims
of ISIL genocides in North Africa and the Middle East.
These Catholic lobbying efforts motivated a movement
in Lithuania, which prompted a resolution in the Seimas
of the Republic of Lithuania recognizing “The Genocide
of Christians and Other Religious Minorities in the Mid-
dle East And North”, (Seimas of the Republic of Lithua-
nia, 2015), whichwas cited by the Knights of Columbus in
their 200-page documentation of genocides committed
by ISIL against religious minorities that they submitted
to the United States House of Representatives, calling on
the United States Congress to recognize genocides com-
mitted by ISIL against all religious minorities—including
Muslim groups.
The genocide discourses examined in this article are
types of strategic narratives in which the deployment of
the concept of genocide, either purposefully or reflex-
ively by parties to the conflict, or by third parties or out-
side actors, provides an organizing framework for col-
lective action, defining a community’s identity, its val-
ues and goals, and the stakes of its struggles, vis-à-vis
an other in a conflict. The application of the concept
of genocide within a strategic narrative carries a set
of assumptions about what genocide is, what kinds of
people commit genocide, and what kinds of people ex-
perience genocide. And, importantly, it carries assump-
tions about how these people who commit or experi-
ence genocide should be treated, and how individuals
and groups should respond to genocide. In some in-
stances, therefore, a genocide discourse can play a gen-
erative role in a conflict, shaping decisions undertaken
by groups and states beyond other forces such as im-
mediate economic interests. More frequently, a geno-
cide discourse is coopted or directly employed as a fram-
ing device by elites and leaders, such as national policy
makers, within the context of a larger strategic narrative,
to try and shape group support and promote group co-
hesion around a particular goal. Scholars have demon-
strated that actors in conflicts around the world have
attempted—sometimes successfully—to portray them-
selves as victims of genocide in order to convince pow-
erful foreign states to interfere in a conflict on their be-
half (Kuperman, 2008). This paper advances a similar ar-
gument, attempting to shed light on the way certain ac-
tors determine that some groups are victims or perpetra-
tors of genocide and other are not, in order to alter the
way those actors are perceived and treated, and thereby
advance their own strategic goals within the context of
larger conflicts.
2. Genocide Discourses
2.1. Victims, Politics, and Legacies of Totalitarianism
There are two historic, organizing principles of the geno-
cide prevention movement. The first is that external vi-
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olence is the only means of stopping genocide. The cut-
ting edges of the atrocity prevention field of practice fo-
cus on improving the ability of people in influential posi-
tions to identify genocidal processes andmake ethical de-
cisions to resist genocide (Waller, 2016), while bolstering
peace processes that provide a context inwhich these de-
cisions can be made and supported (Moix, 2016; Rosen-
berg, Galis, & Zucker, 2016). Such approaches, promi-
nent amongst peacemaking practitioners, reject the as-
sumption that genocide can only be prevented through
external force or armed force. What is notable in these
cases, however, is that scholars and practitioners who ad-
vocate for such an approach simply avoid using the word
genocide all together (see Weiss, 2012), or they go to
great lengths to argue that genocide is not an act, but
a complex social process in which individuals are con-
stantly making decisions that allow genocide to occur
(seeWaller, 2016). In fact, when activists and policy mak-
ers deploy the language of “mass atrocity prevention” or
“the responsibility to protect” instead of using genocide,
and when they differentiate between crimes against hu-
manity and genocide, they acknowledge a wide range
of non-violent and non-coercive ways of preventing or
stopping atrocities (Irvin-Erickson, 2017a; Weiss, 2012).
When theword genocide emerges in academic and social
discourses about a given conflict, however, a different
set of assumptions is put in place, assumptions that tend
to privilege external violence as the only path towards
peace. What is it about the word genocide that makes
people see a conflict differently when the word geno-
cide is used instead of another term? What is it about
the word genocide, and the word’s connotations, that
lead people to see violence as the only way to prevent
the act?
This pillar of the genocide prevention tradition has
its roots in a closely related field of study, the study of to-
talitarianism. Raphaël Lemkin, in Axis Rule in Occupied
Europe, the book in which the word genocide first ap-
pears in print, framed his study of Axis governments as a
study of totalitarianism (Lemkin, 1944, p. ix). The theory
of totalitarianism in the 1920s and early 1930s centered
around a belief that the total state altered the social fab-
ric of society to eliminate the basis of political opposi-
tion, or to create a “new man” in order to facilitate the
ideological goals of a regime. Lemkin, on the other hand,
would disaggregate the concept of totalitarianism—the
“total” control of a political regime over political and
social life—from the practice of altering the social fab-
ric of society through violence and coercion, a practice
he called genocide. In Lemkin’s foray into this theory,
he used the term genocide to refer to the destruction
of social groups. This allowed him to argue that geno-
cide was as old as human history, but became a useful
strategy of governing that was employed by totalitar-
ian governments. Genocide, for Lemkin, was therefore
not intrinsic to totalitarianism. However, Lemkin’s views
on genocide and totalitarianism were never widely ac-
cepted (Irvin-Erickson, 2017b). A host of other theorists
brought genocide studies to a position that resembled
the study of totalitarianism, and set the pace for geno-
cide prevention movements of the second half of the
twentieth century.
Hannah Arendt (1951) believed totalitarian regimes
used violence and terror to obliterate political life. Bor-
rowing from the zeitgeist of the day (Iakovou, 2009;
Söllner, 2004), her central notion was that totalitarian
regimes ruled through violence and terror. Totalitarian
regimes, for Arendt, could not be swept away by politi-
cal movements within their societies. Instead, brutal yet
irrational, they could only come to an end when their ir-
rational priorities led to internal collapse, or when they
were toppled externally through violence. A similar be-
lief can be found in the writings of Karl Wittfogel (1931,
1938, 1957) who is known in English language scholar-
ship forOriental Despotism: AComparative Study of Total
Power, which synthesized much of his previous scholar-
ship on the total systems of power in oriental and Chi-
nese states. In his study of “hydraulic dynasties” that
ruled by monopolizing access to water in their empires,
Wittfogel argued that the administrative infrastructure
needed to control access to water and irrigation gener-
ated governmental institutions that were well-suited for
serving asmechanisms of social control—such as special-
ized bureaucracies and military units designed not for
fighting wars but enforcing laws. These institutions gen-
erated andmaintained social hierarchies, and buttressed
the power of ruling elites. While there were pretenders
to the throne who were constantly warring and assas-
sinating each other, the dynasties as a whole survived
despite the internal divisions, Wittfogel argued, because
each dynasty’s political power was derived from its total
control over the social and political institutions of the so-
ciety. Totalitarianism, for Wittfogel, was functional, not
irrational, leading him to argue (against Arendt) that such
regimes would not self-destruct. Since these institutions
gave the rulers of these states the ability to obliterate the
social and political groups that opposed them, the only
way the dynasties fell, Wittfogel argued, was when they
were swept away by military forces from outside of their
own social and political base.
The basic thesis was nearly ubiquitous throughout
the anti-totalitarianism and genocide prevention move-
ments and traditions. The jurist Antoni Wereszczyński
(1928), a major figure in Lemkin’s intellectual circles
whom Lemkin drew upon, argued that the totalitarian
regimes of Europe did not arise from military coups, but
from revolutionary upheavals with a social basis. Once
in power, the revolutionary organization “relies on the
apotheosis of the state, on a belief in its almost mirac-
ulous might, on a strict connection between the state
and the victorious organization or its leader, and on the
elimination of the rest of the population from having any
influence at all” (as cited in Kornat, 2006, p. 84). Any
political machinations of the population to try and put
an end to the regime and its systems of violence were
therefore futile—violencewas the only way out, because
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the state itself was willing to kill entire groups who had
alternate ideas about how the society should be gov-
erned. In another classic study of totalitarianism, Franz
Neumann (1942) argued that the National Socialist Party
in Germany constructed a “state-less” state that lacked
modern political institutions necessary for reining in the
power struggles of competing groups whose only com-
mon groundwas hatred, propelling the state towards un-
controlled violence and expansionary war. Sigmund Neu-
mann (1942), on the other hand, proposed that the to-
talitarian state was brought into being through a one-
party system that mobilized masses of people in support
of its program by stoking anger at imagined enemies,
and then violently crushing internal political opponents
through a military apparatus created to fight these imag-
ined external foes. Thus the totalitarian government, for
Sigmund Neumann, created a state of permanent revolu-
tion throughwhich it stayed in power, exclusively, by gen-
erating imaginary enemies of the revolution. Both Franz
and Sigmund Neumann, coming from different starting
points, arrive at the belief that the totalitarian state’s
murderous willingness to annihilate entire groups was
the pillar of its strength, and would only come to an end
through the internal collapse of the state and the regime
(when they ran out of imagined enemies and began to
kill their own supporters), or through external force. And,
finally, Ernst Fraenkel (1941/2017), argued that the Na-
tional Socialist government divided German law into two
competing areas, forming a “prerogative state” governed
by the party which ruled through arbitrary violence, and
a “normative state” which maintained the legal order
and protected the legitimacy of German courts. Here,
again, we find a situation close to Wereszczyński’s terms,
where the legal system of totalitarian regimes eliminates
individual rights and asserts state control over the life
and property of the ruled, allowing political enemies to
be repressed violently but legally, while legalizing and
empowering an “unthinking grey mass, a mob whipped
along in the direction indicated by the almighty rulers”
(as cited in Kornat, 2006, p. 84). From Wereszczyński,
Wittfogle, Neumann, Neumann, Fraenkel, and Arendt,
among others, thus was born an intellectual tradition
that has animated the genocide prevention and human-
itarian intervention movements for the last century: the
idea that once a regime becomes genocidal or totalitar-
ian, internal collapse or violent intervention from the
outside are the only ways the regime, and the mass vi-
olence it commits, can be brought to an end. As Arendt
put it in On Violence, in the totalitarian state that rules
through violence, the only pillars of political power for
the regime are the state security forces and a network of
informers—beyond this, political or moral challenges to
the regime and its violence are utterly useless (Arendt,
1970, pp. 81–84).
After this generation of thinkers, totalitarianism
quickly became an “essentialist” concept, employed in
social scientific and political discourse to justify Amer-
ican democracy over Soviet communism and fascism
(Spiro & Barber, 1970). Dirk Moses (2006) has observed
that the field of genocide studies resembles “a version
of totalitarianism theory” because “the definition of
genocide—at least a true one [according to the field’s
theorists]—can only be committed by a totalitarian or
at least authoritarian state driven by a utopian ideol-
ogy”. This is why, Moses writes, when the word geno-
cide is invoked, public, policy, and scholarly debates in
the United States tend to focus on the ideological or
religious-political dynamics of a regime. For example,
the debates in the United States over the Darfur geno-
cide in the late 2000s became “preoccupied with the Is-
lamism of the Khartoum regime rather than the logic of
counter-insurgency and civil war, a potential in all soci-
eties” (Moses, 2006). Such framings of genocide that lo-
cate the causal variable of genocide within a regime or a
society’s ideologies—therefore—serve to locate the phe-
nomenon of genocide within unfamiliar non-Western,
non-liberal, or non-democratic ideologies, which in turn
justifies the familiar over the unfamiliar, the liberal over
the non-liberal, the democratic over the non-democratic,
and the Western over the non-Western (see Hinton,
2012). The genocide prevention and humanitarian inter-
vention movements that inherited this intellectual tradi-
tion, moreover, also employ a system of knowledge built
around conceptions of good and evil, rather than a falsifi-
able relationship between the objective social conditions
and subjective relations of people in conflict.
These connotations embedded within the concept
of genocide make it exceedingly difficult for peacemak-
ing practitioners, legal practitioners, and policy makers
to use the word. Practitioners who attempt to prevent
the kinds of mass violence that the word “genocide”
is intended to signify often prefer, instead, to use the
phrase “responsibility to protect” to denote the norma-
tive principle of preventing genocide, and the phrase
“mass atrocity prevention” to denote the practical ap-
plication of the genocide prevention norm (Evans, 2008;
Rosenberg, 2009; Scheffer, 2006). By avoiding the word
genocide and instead using the phrases “responsibility
to protect” and “mass atrocity prevention,” as Evans
(2008), Rosenberg (2009), Scheffer (2006), and Weiss
(2007) have pointed out in different ways, practitioners
and policy makers have been able to avoid the rhetorical
traps and reductionist connotations that “genocide,” as
a word, evokes. When scholars and policy makers frame
a conflict as genocide, and then present genocide in the
terms of a systematic theory of good and evil; express
conceptions of genocide that locate genocide within the
unfamiliar; and carry over the belief that genocide can
only be stopped through external violence, external vio-
lence to stop genocide and topple totalitarian regimes
is presented as just and necessary (see Moses, 2006,
2011b). From these starting points, to determine that
a group is suffering genocide, and then to oppose us-
ing violence to protect the group, is often seen as tak-
ing the side of the perpetrators morally, and thus to side
with evil.
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2.2. Strategic Narratives and Genocide Discourses
Strategic narratives, in shaping perceptions of conflicts
to influence political behaviors, limit the opportunity for
political contestation when they are accepted as social
fact (Jackson, 2003; Mattern, 2005). This is especially
so in genocide discourses that present complex conflict
processes in good/bad binary terms, making the belief
that a particular group is a “victim group” or a “per-
petrator group” seem like a social fact (Subotić, 2016,
p. 615). When the good/bad binary is laid over the vic-
tim/perpetrator binary, and combined with the sense
that external violence is the only way to stop the perpe-
tration of genocide, genocide discourses shut down crit-
ical analysis of a conflict. Strategic narratives reduce po-
litical space for debate by making alternative narratives
sound incoherent and not compelling (Krebs & Lobasz,
2007; Subotić, 2016, p. 615). The ability of genocide dis-
courses to make it seem like a social fact that certain
groups are good or bad intensifies this “lock-in effect”
(Goddard, 2006). Dissenting points of view about how to
act vis-à-vis the perpetrators or victims are presented as
hopelessly naïve, at best, or morally evil at worst. This
muddles the criteria necessary for making ethical judg-
ments. The ability to know how to act and why, there-
fore, becomes obscured in this closed system of logic. As
a result, the potential for actors to articulate moral ar-
guments collapses into moralizing, while acting to stop
genocide and to topple totalitarian regimes is taken as
unquestionably good, and failing to do so as unquestion-
ably bad. In such constructions, once the word genocide
has been uttered, themoral judgement has already been
made. This is what makes genocide discourses effective
types of strategic narratives, directing political behav-
iors towards intervening against the perpetrator group,
and presenting inaction in defense of the victims as a
moral evil.
If genocide is an act that must be stopped, how
should it be stopped? Many doubt that genocide can
be ended peacefully because they assume that geno-
cide is either a decentralized, pathological act with per-
petrators at every level of society or an act impelled by
the momentum of a huge bureaucratic enterprise be-
yond the control of anybody (Heidenrich, 2001, p. 95).
When genocide is viewed in such terms, it appears that
genocide is caused by either everyone in a society or
no one. From this premise, an intellectual and concep-
tual holdover from the theory of totalitarianism, the only
sanction against genocide is the application of external
violence: war.
In seeing genocide as an evil act, one that is simul-
taneously committed by everyone and no one, the mo-
tives for the act collapse into the act itself. The killing of
a group is seen as the reason why perpetrators kill the
group. This tautology ascribes the beginning to the end,
leaving the analyst to understand genocide not as polit-
ical or sociological, but a type of sui generous violence.
Preventing genocide is therefore about stopping those
who will be killers from killing, not about understanding
the ethical decisions people face in genocidal programs,
the reasons why people lend their support to a genoci-
dal program when they would otherwise stand opposed,
why people remain bystanders, and how and why peo-
ple make decisions to act upon their knowledge, either
resisting or collaborating. The paradox is that genocide
cries out for retribution, even generations later, because
it is resistible, and not an indomitable phenomenon that
can only be stopped by violence (Bronner, 1999, p. 318).
The tragedy of reducing genocide to an inevitable evil
is that the “all-encompassing evil of the holocaust” as
with any other genocide, ironically “is precisely what de-
mands a sense of nuance in making ethical judgments”
(Bronner, 1999, p. 318).
2.3. The Victims as Moral Innocents
If the belief that external violence is the only means for
preventing genocide is a pillar of the humanitarian inter-
vention and genocide prevention traditions, then this be-
lief generates a second pillar that affirms the assump-
tions of the first. This second pillar is that the victims
of genocide are not parties in a conflict, but moral in-
nocents guilty of neither wrong-doing, nor of inflicting
any perceived injury upon their victimizers. The position
is derived from an assumption in theories of totalitarian
explained above. The victims, in such visions, are killed
for no other reason than to advance the political, social,
or utopian agendas of their killers (see Moses, 2011a).
When the formulation is deployed in strategic narratives,
it creates the belief that genocide ceases to be genocide
when the victims are acting unethically, or when they are
guilty of a crime or moral wrongdoing, or if they are in
conflict with their victimizers. In other words, genocide
cannot be committed against people who have done bad
things to their aggressors—in such cases, those who are
killed en masse are no longer thought of as victims of
genocide, but casualties of war or civilian casualties.
Arendt’s insistence in Eichmann in Jerusalem that no
one or no groupwas ever completely innocent, when she
pointed to the complicity of many individual Jews and
the role of Jewish councils in aiding the German geno-
cide, provoked intense backlash and led many to accuse
her of blaming the Jews for their own fate (Arendt, 1963).
Yet, she also argued that because no group deserved to
have genocide committed against them, the attempt to
destroy an entire group did render the group innocent in
the sense that they were not guilty of a crime or offense
that would have warranted their total annihilation as a
group. To seek the extermination of German National So-
cialists, as a social group, after the war was to commit
genocide. Thus, for Arendt, no group could ever deserve
to have genocide committed against them no matter
how bad their individuals were. The same was true in all
cases of mass violence, Arendt argued, not just genocide.
In totalitarian regimes such as the Soviet Union, which
Arendt believed was not genocidal in ideology, “terror as
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we know it today strikes without any provocation [and]
its victims are innocent even form the point of view of
the persecutor” (Arendt, 1951/1973, p. 6). The arbitrari-
ness of terror, where Bolshevik officials and police offi-
cers could become the victims of police terror, meant
that “nobody, not even the executioners, can ever be
free of fear”. Even when those who were guilty of com-
mitting atrocities became the victims of the same atroc-
ities, Arendt wrote, “the arbitrariness by which victims
are chosen” meant that these individuals were “objec-
tively innocent” regardless of what they may have done
or not done (Arendt, 1951/1973, p. 6). Though the vic-
tims were objectively innocent, the victim group could
not be morally innocent for Arendt. Yet, as the field of
genocide studies developed its own theoretical litera-
ture, the distinction betweenmoral innocence and objec-
tive innocence, the sense of being guilty of wrong doing,
began it elide.
One of the seminal figures in the field, the sociolo-
gist Irving Louis Horowitz defines genocide as “a struc-
tural and systematic destruction of innocent people by
a state bureaucratic apparatus” (Horowitz, 2002, p. 23).
The word “innocent” is necessary in Horowitz’s defini-
tion because it “sets [genocide] apart from other social
evils”, and recognizes that “the victim is ‘punished’ for
being part of some particular group, tribe, race, or reli-
gion” (Horowitz, 2002, pp. 29–30). In Horowitz’s perspec-
tive, genocide is a meaningful concept because it signi-
fies an atrocity where the victims are targeted for no
other reason besides their culturally-conditioned iden-
tity and are therefore “innocent” of any other wrong do-
ing (Horowitz, 2002, pp. 23–28).
Similarly, Anderson and Anderson define genocide
as “systematic, cold-blooded, bureaucratically adminis-
tered extermination of entire ethnic, religious, or polit-
ical groups by their own national governments in the ab-
sence of anything that a rational external observer could
consider an adequate reason” (Anderson & Anderson,
2013, p. 6). This suggests genocide could be considered a
legitimate course of action if a rational outside observer
determined the victims were guilty of somewrong doing.
By definition, the authors continue, genocide is only com-
mitted against an imaginary enemy, not a real enemy.
Thus, to eliminate a group that poses a real threat is not
genocide. To “qualify” as genocide, the authors write, “a
campaignmust involve a systematic attempt to eliminate
whole groups, including harmless ‘critics’, innocent fami-
lies, and children, and suspect bystanders”. The authors
add that “merely eliminating actual political rivals is not
genocide. It is unpleasant, but it is politics-as-usual, car-
ried out everywhere” (Anderson & Anderson, 2013, p. 7).
The problem here, as Martin Shaw has observed, is
definitional and methodological. From a social scientific
perspective, it is impossible to maintain that any given
population can be purely perpetrator or purely victim,
given that all social groups contain individuals who them-
selves have complex and changing roles within a con-
flict (Shaw, 2013, p. 36). Yet, in genocide scholarship
(i.e., Anderson & Anderson, 2013; Charny, 1994; Fein,
1993; Horowitz, 2002), and especially in genocide dis-
courses employed by political activists or by nationalist
or ethnic group actors, the perpetrator social group is
presented as a coherent group defined by purely evil in-
tentions while the victims are presented as passive recip-
ients of violence, not actors or parties in conflict (Shaw,
2013, p. 35). What is more, even in the most asymmet-
rical of conflicts, Shaw contends, individual victim-actors
might be mostly people who are not perpetrators of vi-
olence against civilians, but the larger group to which
they belong will inevitably include individuals who are.
Yet, the “purity of the victims’ victimhood is important
not only formaintaining a simple ‘perpetrator/victim’ an-
alytical model, but also for group ‘ownership’ of geno-
cide”. The idea of the “singular victim-groups”, Shaw con-
tinues, “becomes a device policing communal identities”
and “often of political institutions and causes which mo-
bilize them” (Shaw, 2013, p. 36).
As this paperwill argue in the next sections, the geno-
cide discourses in America over ISIL genocides created
a sense that the perpetrator group was purely and co-
herently evil which, in turn, ascribed that evil to every
individual member of the social group. The conceptual
holdovers from the theory of totalitarianism carried over
into the genocide discourse, leading to a collective sense
that only external violence could end the genocide. Be-
cause the social group was seen as a coherent collection
of individuals, the strategic narrative that emerged was
one that framed the prevention of genocide as requiring
the extermination of the entire social group and all the
individuals who were part of it—a policy response that
itself is genocidal.
In regards to the conflict betweenRussia andUkraine,
a similar process is evident. For Ukrainian nationalists,
Donald Beachler (2011, p. 150) writes, the notion of be-
ing the victims of genocide at the hands of Russian chau-
vinists decades ago provides Ukrainian actors with the
ability to claim historical moral innocence, which is seen
as legitimizing theUkrainian position in the conflict for in-
ternational and domestic audiences. Given the substan-
tial Russian-speaking population in Ukraine, Ukrainian
nationalist political leaders believe it is necessary to mo-
bilize Ukrainian nationalist sentiments against Russia, as
a country and ethnic community. The genocide discourse
employed by Russian officials and state-backed media,
in return, frames the Ukrainian government as support-
ing genocidal violence against ethnic Russians in Ukraine.
The Russian government’s claims against Ukraine, while
spurious, are made in reference to this anti-Russian ax-
iom of Ukrainian nationalism. From the perspective of
the government in Moscow, this genocide discourse is
also highly purposeful, presenting an image for domestic
consumption that Ukraine and all ethnic Ukrainians are
a coherent and malevolent group. This prescribes con-
tentious and violent struggle as the only way for defend-
ing the good, while conferring a sense of historical and
moral innocence on self-identified ethnic Russians.
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3. Ukraine and Russia
At least since the 2004 Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian
nationalist movement, which is seeking to end Russian
suzerainty in Ukraine, has dedicated a significant por-
tion of its energies to proving that the Soviet treatment
of Ukraine in the 1930s and 1940s constituted geno-
cide (Beachler, 2011). In 2008, when Ukrainian Presi-
dent Viktor Yushchenko traveled to Canada, where a
large Ukrainian diaspora carries significant influence, he
carried two diplomatic goals: laying the ground work
for Ukraine’s entry into NATO and official recognition
of the Holodomor, the great famine of 1932 and 1933,
as genocide (Clark, 2008; Potter, 2008; Wood, 2008).
Yushchenko—who was poisoned by dioxin in 2004 in
an attack attributed to the Russian government—was
one of the stalwarts of the Orange Revolution, leading a
movement to strengthen Ukraine’s ties to the West and
break away from the influence of Russia. Within the con-
text of this political movement, asserting that Stalin or-
chestrated a genocide in Ukraine in the 1930s become a
powerful statement, mobilizing and legitimizing the na-
tionalist movement by drawing a straight line between
the direct control of Moscow over Ukraine in the Soviet
Union in the 1930s and the Russian Federation’s influ-
ence over Ukraine in the 2000s. The implicit claim was
that Russian political, social, and economic dominance
over Ukraine today is a direct consequence of the geno-
cide of the 1930s, which brought Ukraine under the or-
bit of Moscow through a campaign of Russification. This
genocide discourse sought to cast Ukrainians, as a group,
as historical victims of Moscow to legitimize the nation-
alist movement’s current efforts to economically and po-
litically break away fromMoscow and align Ukraine with
the European Union (see Motyl, 2017).
When Yushchenko’s successor Viktor Yanukovichwas
elected through the support of his of Russian-speaking
political base, the Ukrainian government backed away
from all claims that the Soviet Union had committed
genocide in an attempt to “Russify” Ukraine. When
Yanukovich was driven from power in popular protests
in 2014, Russian troops invaded the country to se-
cure Russian interests in the Donbas region and Crimea.
The genocide discourse amongst Ukrainian political par-
ties seeking to align the country with the European
Union and NATO reemerged after the Russian annexa-
tion of Crimea in 2014, especially when evidence be-
gan to emerge that the new Russian-backed authori-
ties in Crimea were marginalizing and dispossessing eth-
nic Tatar communities (Blank, 2015; Korostelina, 2015;
Uehling, 2015). A growing number of Ukrainian leaders
began to cite both the Holodomor and the 1944 geno-
cide of the Crimean Tatars as evidence that the Russian
Federation’s invasion and support of rebels in the Don-
bas region and the annexation of Crimea were illegiti-
mate because Moscow’s dominance over these regions
today is a consequence of the genocides in the 1930s
and 1940s.
The Russian government responded by claiming
Ukraine was plotting genocide today. The response was
a text-book example of political elites crafting a strate-
gic narrative to create public support for armed con-
flict, while promoting group cohesion. In a broad sense,
political life depends on narratives, which individuals
use to make sense of the world and their own identity-
position within social groups (Somers, 1994), establish-
ing the criteria by which individuals interpret political re-
ality and create knowledge about how to act (Franzosi,
1998; Patterson & Monroe, 1998). Narratives as such,
however, are not spontaneous. Political actors—from in-
dividual elites to political parties, social movements, and
governments—craft stories that influence people to act
in certain ways or support certain policies. Political ac-
tors can invent narratives of historic victimization at the
hands of a particular group in the past in order to justify
political suppression, repression, or even mass violence
against that group in the present. This dynamic is evident
in cases of genocide, from the genocides of Native Amer-
icans to genocides in the former Yugoslavia, where politi-
cal actors couch their attempts to annihilate a group not
as a form of self-serving political gain, but as necessary
for protecting society from that group (Bergholz, 2016;
Madley, 2016; Naimark, 2002).
I argue that the introduction of genocide discourses
in these types of strategic narratives can be a powerful
motivator of such political and collective action. Geno-
cide discourseswithin strategic narratives do not present
conflicts as conflicts, but primordial struggles between
good and evil, which directs political communities to-
wards supporting polices of armedmilitary interventions
to suppress genocide. The claim that emerged from Rus-
sian government officials that Ukrainian nationalist ac-
tors were manufacturing a false history of Soviet geno-
cides was used to present Ukrainian political actors as
geo-political imposters and academic amateurs. The cor-
responding claim that it was Ukrainians who were us-
ing this imagined history to justify Ukrainian genocides
against ethnic Russians in Ukraine was, in turn, a handy
tool for creating a strategic narrative that positioned
Ukrainians as deserving political repression. Indeed, the
Russian invasion of Crimea and the Donbas region of
Ukraine were framed by Moscow as attempts to de-
fend ethnic Russian speakers—a large minority group
in Ukraine—from ethnic cleansing and genocide at the
hands of chauvinist Ukrainians who falsely demonized
Russians as genocidaires and used them as a scapegoat
to explain away the country’s political and economic
struggles (Weiss-Wendt, in press).1
As officials in the Russian government began accus-
ing Ukrainians of inciting genocide against Russians, the
Russian Foreign Ministry began efforts to thwart sup-
port amongst American activists and academics to rec-
1 Weiss-Wendt (in press) cites “Russia Investigates Ukrainian Top Brass Over ‘Genocide’”, from the The Moscow Times (2 October 2014); and “Bastryrkin:
Chislo postradvshikh ot voennykh prestuplenii kievskogo rezhima prevysilo 22000 chelovek”, available at http://rusnext.ru/news/1454064729
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ognize the Holodomor as genocide. One tactic, designed
to present Americans as hypocrites in front of Russian
and Russian-speaking Ukrainian audiences, was to claim
that the United States had no moral standing to accuse
the Soviet Union of genocide in the past because white
police officers in the United States kill so many black cit-
izens (Weiss-Wendt, in press). In this sense, the Russian
response to accusations of genocide in Ukraine were re-
markably similar to the position taken by pro-Russian
scholars and Russian diplomats during the brief war with
Georgia in 2008 over the Abkhazia and South Ossetia re-
gions, when they argued that Russia’s military interven-
tion in Georgia did not violate international law, but in-
stead upheld the norms of the law because the war was
an effort to protect the vulnerable ethnic Russian popu-
lation from the Georgian governments’ human rights vio-
lations and genocidal intentions. When challenged, they
simply referred to Western intervention in Kosovo, Iraq,
and Libya that were legitimized under slogans of geno-
cide prevention and the responsibility to protect norm
(Irvin-Erickson, 2017a; Rubenstein, 2017). The position
coming from the Moscow government was surprisingly
frank. If the United States and Western Europe could ar-
bitrarily pickwhich groupwas an innocent victim of geno-
cide (or a potential victim of genocide), to legitimize a for-
eign war in the name of the victims, then why couldn’t
Russia arbitrarily pick who to defend or not defend?
In 2015, the Russian justice department labeled
Lemkin’s (1953/2014) essay on the Soviet genocide in
Ukraine, written in 1953, as “extremist literature”, fur-
ther escalating the war of words in the genocide dis-
course and officially censoring the writings of someone
who is largely considered a human rights hero, but who
is considered an anti-Russian chauvinist in Russia (Irvin-
Erickson, 2017a, pp. 48–50; Russian Ministry of Justice,
2015; Weiss-Wendt, in press). This determination came
at a time when academics in Ukraine, the United States,
and Canada were beginning to discover Lemkin’s writ-
ing on Soviet genocides in Ukraine, and the Holodomor.
From the perspective of the Ukrainian nationalist move-
ment, and its supporters from Ukrainian diasporas in
Canada and the United States, positioning Ukraine col-
lectively as a victim of genocide in the past would con-
fer a sense of historical innocence on Ukraine as a coun-
try today, which could be translated into political capital
in a geo-political struggle (Beachler, 2011, pp. 147–152).
The Russian government tried to establish a counter
narrative that negated the claims of victimhood by ei-
ther drawing Ukraine and the West as morally equiv-
alent to Russia or, better yet, positioning ethnic Rus-
sians in Ukraine as the innocent victims of the hypo-
critical aggressors in Ukraine and the West. The geno-
cide discourse, from both sides of the conflict, sought
to manipulate public sentiments about innocence and
guilt through the language of genocide to legitimize cer-
tain positions in the armed conflict—with great effort
amongst Ukrainian political movements to translate this
into a stronger response from Western countries in sup-
port of the Ukrainian position, and attempts by Moscow
to counter this moralizing discourse with a discourse of
moral equivalency.
The Russian government’s genocide narrative—
though it did not persuade international audiences of
Ukraine’s illegitimacy—created a framework to promote
group cohesion amongst the public in Russia and amongst
Russian speakers in Ukraine to rally support for Russian
military action and Moscow’s political goals in Ukraine
(Balzer, 2015). But these dynamics are not unique to the
Russian government’s attempts to rationalize an invasion
of Ukraine. They are likewise on full display in attempts
in the United States to understand and frame American
conflicts in Iraq and Syria, and understand how to act.
4. The United States and the Islamic State
In the humanitarian intervention and genocide preven-
tion traditions, witnesses and bystanders to genocide
and mass atrocities are conceptualized as parties to the
conflict—taking an implicit side against the victims by
virtue of their self-perceived neutrality and their un-
willingness or inability to act in defense of the victims
(Charny, 2016, p. 8). The victims, meanwhile, are pre-
sented as not being parties to the conflict. Thus the con-
flict, in genocide, is presented as being between the per-
petrators and the rest of humanity. Therefore—as an ex-
tension of this logical frame—the goal of the advocacy
movement against genocide is to move state actors and
international organizations from their neutral positions
(which is seen as pitting them against the victims) into
taking actions in defense of the victims, or to prevent and
prosecute genocide.
A significant boost to the movement to intervene hu-
manitarianly in defense of the victims of ISIL genocide
came with a June 2016 determination by the UN Hu-
man Rights Council that genocide was being committed
against Yezidis, a claim substantiated in a report to the
UN Human Rights Council by the independent Interna-
tional Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Repub-
lic (Dieng &Welsh, 2014, UN Doc. A/HRC/32/CRP.2). The
finding gave spirit to movements to pressure states to of-
ficially recognize the genocide of Yezidis, with the goal of
activating states’ treaty-obligations under the UN Geno-
cide Convention to protect civilians and prevent and
prosecute the genocide (Kikoler, 2015; Stanton, 2015).
There were also groups that wanted a legal determina-
tion of genocide in order to aid international efforts to re-
settle Yezidis as refugees.2 Christian groups in the United
States were especially effective inmobilizing pressure on
congressional representatives to pressure the State De-
partment to include Christians as victims of ISIL geno-
cide, in an effort to legitimize wide humanitarian protec-
tions and expansive refugee acceptance policies in the
2 For recent continuations of the argument, see Open Letter of Cross-Party British PMs to Home Secretary Amber Rudd, 17 November 2016, available at
https://gallery.mailchimp.com/cbe8d3ab1c3cb6ca29607bbe2/files/1611_Iraqi_Religious_Minorities_Letter.pdf
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United States (Toosi, 2015, 2016). This movement culmi-
nated in a resolution before the House of Representa-
tives, which passed unanimously, determining that ISIL
was committing genocide against Christians and Yezidis
(Congress, 2015). The determination that ISIL was com-
mitting genocide against Christians, in addition to Yezidis,
became an important factor in the discourses employed
by lobby groups in the United States who wanted to
resettle ISIL victims in the United States as refugees
(Knights of Columbus & In Defense of Christians, 2016).
However, the genocide discourse to recognize the
Christian victims of ISIL genocides emerged from within
the context of a larger strategic narrative taking shape in
the United States, which was placing increasing pressure
on President Obama’s administration between 2015 and
2016 to frame United States foreign policy and human-
itarian policy in group-selective religious terms. The in-
clusion of Christians as victims of genocide along with
the Yezidis, in the context of this second genocide dis-
course, created a problem for the Obama administra-
tion. With the emergence of a growing genocide dis-
course that was not orientated towards changing United
States foreign policy to expand humanitarian relief to vic-
tims, but rather to orientate United States policy towards
eradiating ISIL militarily, any statement that genocide
was being committed only against Yezidis and Christians
would appear to be disregarding the deaths of Muslims
at the hands of ISIL. The Obama administration faced a
dilemma. To include Christians and Yezidis as the only rec-
ognized victims of genocide would make it appear that
the United States was drawing a distinction between the
victims of ISIL violence, to suggest that the deaths ofMus-
lims were not as morally reprehensible as the deaths of
non-Muslims. This was despite the fact that individuals
from all religious groups were dying brutally at the hands
of ISIL fighters, in the same conflict—and despite the fact
that the genocide discourse employed by Catholic lobby
groups was intended to use a common Christian iden-
tity to expand humanitarian sentiments amongst West-
ern Christians to all victims of ISIL violence.
Yet, including Muslims as the victims of ISIL gen-
ocides—in the perspective of many—would be tanta-
mount to denying the genocide against Yezidis and Chris-
tians, or tantamount to denying that ISIL was genoci-
dal. Before exploring why, it is worth noting that this
put the Obama administration in a political bind. With
pressure mounting on the Obama administration, the
United States Department of State attempted to finesse
the dilemma, and determined that ISIL was committing
genocide in Syria and Iraq against Yezidis, Christians, and
Shia Muslims (Kerry, 2016). Secretary of State John Kerry
(2016) included Shiite Muslims in his official statement,
noting that the Islamic State was seeking to “cleanse the
land of [Shiite] filth”. But he conveniently left out Sunni
Muslims as victims of ISIL genocide—even though Sunni
Muslims were being killed by ISIL in much the sameman-
ner as the other victims. If the list of victims could be
expanded to include these different religious minorities,
why not add Kurds and Sunnis to the list of ISIL victims of
genocide, as well?
The absence of Sunnis as a victim of ISIL genocide
within the genocide discourse implies that, because ISIL
is based geographically in historically Sunni Arab lands,
and because it is a self-proclaimed Sunni movement, its
victims of genocide would not be Sunni. ISIL fighters and
leaders might target Sunnis for death and terror, accord-
ing to this logic, but not genocide. This is despite the
fact that a majority of the cities and towns destroyed,
and the millions of people displaced, by ISIL violence
are Sunni. Human rights monitors have documented ISIL
enslavement, rape, massacre, and kidnapping of Sunni
victims—the same kinds of atrocities ISIL has committed
against members of all other groups (Sly, 2016; Tayler,
2017; Wille, 2016a). This genocide discourse, which re-
moves Sunnis from being recognized as victims of ISILS
genocide, implies that Sunni Muslims are a monolithic
group, where the atrocities committed by Sunni actors
(ISIL) impugns the whole group of Sunni Muslims. Thus,
SunniMuslims become collectively guilty of ISIL attempts
to destroy entire groups—guilty of genocide. Likewise,
for those who advocate for a narrative that ISIL is com-
mitting genocide against Christians and Yezidis, and thus
leave out Muslims as victims of genocide, the ISIL tar-
geting of all Muslims is not presented as genocide. The
reasoning is simple. The axiom of the genocide discourse
that demands that the victims of genocidemust bemoral
innocents and the perpetrators morally bad creates a sit-
uationwhere one group cannot commit genocide against
themselves. Thus, from this discursive framing, to claim
that Sunnis were both victims and perpetrators of geno-
cide against Sunnis is nonsensical. The notion that the
victim group is also the perpetrator group invalidates the
notion that the victim group is morally innocent—which
means, according to this frame, that they cannot be the
victims of genocide. Likewise, to view ISIL genocides as
a genocide of Muslims against Yezidis and Christians ex-
cludes Muslims from ranks of victims of genocide.
The framing of the violence as such, to suggest that
Sunnis cannot be the victims of ISIL genocide (because
ISIL is a Sunni group), or that Muslims cannot be the vic-
tims of ISIL genocide (because ISIL is a Muslim group),
is social scientifically unsound and politically dangerous.
The framing sets in motion a discourse of placing collec-
tive blame for ISIL violence on Sunni Islam, or all of Islam
(Tayler, 2017; Wille, 2016b). If Muslims are the perpetra-
tors of genocide, then their victims—Yezidis, Christians—
are moral innocents, which confers upon the perpetrator
a corresponding sense of evil intrinsic to their group iden-
tity. The attempt by the Obama administration to finesse
the problem and list Shia Muslims as victims, therefore,
did not change the fundamental axioms of the genocide
discourse, but only reified the reductionist tendency of
genocide discourses to collapse the complexities of the
conflict into simple calculations of good and evil. Within
a year, it would therefore be possible to discern a clear
genocide discourse in the United States that advocated
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exterminating ISIL, and presented ISIL as an intrinsically
evil social group of radical Islamists, or even an evil social
group of all Muslims. Calls to exterminate ISIL, or radical
Islamists, or even all Muslims, were therefore presented
not as genocide, but a form of social protection against
the threat of genocide posed by this group (with some
suggesting the genocidal threat was posed by ISIL, oth-
ers arguing it was posed by radical Sunni Islamists, and
others still citing Islam as the genocidal threat). What
is more, when genocide becomes the operative lens
through which ISIL (or Sunnis, or Islam) was conceptual-
ized, then the prevention of genocide is not seen as involv-
ing the resolution of differences between groups because
there can be no resolution between good victims and bad
perpetrators. Sociological or political projects that deal
with the implications of identity that underscore inter-
group conflicts and genocidal processes were likewise dis-
missed as naïve, since it was (is) believed that there is no
group conflict to resolve. The solution, rather, was seen
as applying external violence to sweep away the genoci-
dal threat posed by ISIL (or Sunnis, or Islam).
The public discourse and the policy conversations in
the United States about how to respond to ISIL, there-
fore, were no more sophisticated than the essentialist
discussions of anti-totalitarianism in generations past. In
presenting ISIL as evil, an evil that is simultaneously en-
gendered by every Sunni and no one in particular, the
motives for ISIL violence collapse into the violence itself.
The tautology that took hold in strategic narratives in
the United States undermined any kind of coherent at-
tempt to respond to the violence in political or sociologi-
cal terms. Preventing ISIL violence, therefore, was about
stopping those who will be killers from killing, not about
understanding the ethical decisions people face, the rea-
sons why people lend their support to ISIL’s genocidal
program when they would otherwise stand opposed,
why people remain bystanders, why they find they can-
not resist, and how and why people make decisions to
act upon their knowledge, either resisting or collaborat-
ing to different degrees.
With the construction of an all-encompassing evil
Islamic enemy, movements in the United States to in-
crease the number of refugees accepted into the United
States, and efforts to expand humanitarian relief by forc-
ing the United States to officially recognizes that ISIL was
committing genocide, collapsed. The initial movements
deploying a genocide discourse to motivate broad and
inclusive humanitarian responses gave way to a strate-
gic narrative that cast the perpetrator group as intrinsi-
cally evil, and sought to legitimize greater uses of Amer-
ican military power in Syria and Iraq in the name of con-
fronting evil. Thus the genocide discourse that prevailed
in the United States argued against accepting victims of
ISIL genocide as refugees for fear that their children, as
members of an intrinsically evil group, might be sympa-
thetic to ISIL or radical Islam. The organizing framework
for collective action became one of orientating United
States foreign policy around specifically Christian inter-
ests, coupled with calls to violently eradicate ISIL as a so-
cial group as the only solution to the genocides commit-
ted by ISIL. With the genocide discourse underpinning
these frameworks, the ability for American policy mak-
ers, leaders, and civil society movements to think clearly
or ethically about the conflict eroded.
The efforts of George W. Bush to combat a tendency
to frame United States foreign policy in religious terms
have been well-documented. In his now-famous address
on 17 September 2001 at the Islamic Center of Washing-
ton, DC, Bush sought to prevent United States foreign
policy from being perceived as being at war with a re-
ligion, and address a rise in anti-Muslim hate crimes in
the country in the wake of the 11 September terrorist
attacks.3 Likewise, the Obama administration and Secre-
tary of State John Kerry worked to ensure United States
foreign policy could not be construed as being anti-Islam
(Kerry, 2014). But the intervening years between 2001
and 2016 saw an awakening of a popular movement
across American society to position United States foreign
policy in explicitly Christian terms—despite 16 years of
efforts from the country’s political elites from both ma-
jor parties to stem this trend. By the second Republican
Party primary presidential debate on 16 September 2015,
the mood of the nation had shifted dramatically.4
During the debate, a consensus emerged amongst
the candidates that Islam was an existential threat to
Western civilization. This consensus took on a feeling of
urgency with the prospect of nuclear-armed Iran and the
rise of ISIL. While the candidates were careful to only
say they would fight against “radicals”, their rhetorical
construction of Western civilization as Jewish and Chris-
tian placed all of world-Islam outside the boundaries of
the Western, the American, and the “us”. One preva-
lent narrative in the United States is that American for-
eign policy should stand in defense of “Western civiliza-
tion”. The strategic narrative creates a sense of coher-
ence in what would otherwise be an arbitrary determi-
nation about who is a friend and who is an enemy, and
which societies are desirable to include within the Amer-
ican security community and which are necessary to ex-
clude (Jackson, 2003). Thus all Islam became implicitly
radical, a world-force excluded from the West that must
be combated. Themessage affirmed the candidates’ anti-
Muslim credentials to those who would vote solely on
anti-Muslim grounds, while allowing the candidates to
plausibly deny any such prejudice to the general Amer-
ican public. The fact that ISIL and Iran were in conflict
with each other, positioned on antagonistic geopolitical
poles, was irrelevant within the strategic narrative that
3 The video and transcript is archived by the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University, available at https://
berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/quotes/george-w-bush-on-islam-and-terrorism–3
4 All citations to the debate come from Time, “Transcript: Read the Full Text of the Second Republican Debate, September 16, 2015”, available at
http://time.com/4037239/second-republican-debate-transcript-cnn
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positioned both actors as united in their opposition to
America and the “West”. Also irrelevant was any mean-
ingful distinction between the strategic goals of these dif-
ferent actors and acts of violence, so that any terrorist
threat to the United States posed by ISIL was presented
as being an expression of their genocidal conduct, and
part of a larger Muslim plot to destroy America. Thus, an
outside observer might draw objective distinctions be-
tween an act of terrorism and an act of genocide, but
the presidential candidates had forged a narrative where
an act of terrorism committed against the United States
by an Islamic actor would necessarily be a reflection of a
“radical Islamic” genocidal objective.
American voters had every reason to worry about nu-
clear weapons falling into the hands of a government
in Iran whose leaders have denied the Holocaust and
called for the destruction of the Jews of Israel. But this
was not the argument being made. Instead, the candi-
dates likened the struggle to prevent a nuclear-armed
Iran to a struggle between two civilizations with des-
tinies structured like a zero-sum game, the Jewish and
Christian West versus the Islamic other. Towards the end
of the three-hour debate, John Kasich—who along with
Jeb Bush urged tolerance and defended the principles
of an individual human rights based approach to world
affairs—evoked the memory of the Holocaust directly,
saying: “One more time in America, we need to revive
the concept of citizenship, where everybody’s actions
make a huge difference in changing the world. We have
a Holocaust memorial on our state house grounds. And
there is one line on there that stands out all the time:
‘If you’ve saved one life, you’ve changed the world’”. In
the 16 September debate, Kasich likened the Nazi Ger-
man attempt to destroy the Jews to the threat posed to
Western civilization by a nuclear-armed Iran and radical
Islamic terrorists. The timing of the reference to theHolo-
caust was opportune in the debate, imbuing a sense of
moral purpose into his call that America revive a unified
concept of citizenship. But the sentence also harkened
back to something he had said two sentences earlier—
that America had to rebuild relationships with “our al-
lies” so that, united, “we’ll fight for freedom and for hu-
man rights”. To the casual listener, Kasich was speaking
in the usual platitudes of the Holocaust as a lesson about
defending citizenship and human rights. But he had al-
ready asserted that the Iran nuclear agreement would
be a positive force in world affairs because it would allow
for the “military option” if “we find out that they may be
developing a nuclear weapon”. And, at the same time, he
added, the agreement provides a framework for working
with allies in “Western civilization, our friends in Europe”,
to restrain Iranian geopolitical ambitions. The fight for
revitalizing citizenship and human rights that Kasich in-
fused with moral purpose through his reference to the
Holocaust was therefore bound up within the struggle
against Iran (and vice-versa),which ultimately demanded
the unity ofWestern civilization to face this Islamic threat
to its existence. What was this thing Kasich was calling
Western civilization? Whatever it was, he saw it as Jew-
ish and Christian.
This sentiment was soon echoed by Mike Huckabee,
who claimed that the Iran deal “is really about the sur-
vival of Western civilization”. A nuclear Iran, the former
governor of Arkansas concluded, threatens “the very
essence of Western civilization”. Later, Kasich went on to
explain his theory of world affairs, linking together the
Iranian regime and ISIL into one coherent threat to the
United States, stating that “Western civilization, all of us,
need to wake up to the fact that those murderers and
rapists need to be called out, and in Western civilization
we need to make it clear that our faith in the Jewish and
Christian principals force us to live a life bigger than our-
selves”. Through this context, what Kasich meant by his
reference to the Holocaust became clear, and tangible.
The Holocaust was a benchmark that the American pub-
lic should use to measure the threat that Iran and ISIL
pose to the existence of theWest. It was a strategic narra-
tive that collapsed distinctions between different Sunni
movements, between Sunni and Shia groups, between
state adversaries and non-state actors, into a single cate-
gory of Islam set in a genocidal struggle against theWest.
The genocide discourse Kasich deployed—although it ad-
vocated for an inclusive, and human-rights based refer-
ence point to orientate a compassionate United States
foreign policy—contained the seeds of its own demise.
Kasich’s construction of a Judeo–ChristianWest that was
fundamentally good, in the context of the genocide dis-
course he set forth, allowed for the silent implication that
theMuslimMiddle Eastwas intrinsically evil. This—in the
debate an in the wider public discourse—allowed for the
rise of a new genocide discourse that undermined Ka-
sich’s own human-rights based policy prescriptions.
What were Kasich’s unstated assumptions about Is-
lam embedded in the statement? Firstly,Western civiliza-
tion was Jewish and Christian. And, by extension, “radi-
cal” Islam would have no place in a world that was safe
for Jewish and Christian civilization. Secondly, in so far as
Jewish and Christian principles allowed for individuals to
“live a life bigger than ourselves”, Islam would drive peo-
ple down into something less, thus fulfilling the prior ex-
pectation that Islam had no place in a world safe for “us”.
Kasich’s human rights based position, therefore, could
not separate itself from the non-human rights based ap-
proach advocated by Huckabee, which opened the door
for Ted Cruz to promise to kill all of the radical Islamists
in the world. Ben Carson had already said in the first de-
bate that he would ignore the Geneva Conventions and
torture Islamic enemies of the United States, and a few
days later he suggested that a Muslim would be unquali-
fied to be president of the United States because a Mus-
lim, by virtue of his group membership, could not share
American values (Bradner, 2015).5 The rhetoric of these
5 See Time, “Transcript: Read the Full Text of the Primetime Republican Debate, August 6, 2015”, available at http://time.com/3988276/republican-
debate-primetime-transcript-full-text
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four politicians—Kasich, Huckabee, Carson, and Cruz—
was highly purposefully, categorically collapsing world
Islam into ISIL, and thereby into genocidal terror. They
were not against Islam, but against radical Islam. Yet they
had constructed a vision of Islam that presented all Islam
as essentially radical, as a monolithic group that exists
outside of the boundaries of the West, whose existence
in the world posed an existential threat to the existence
of Western civilization, which was Jewish and Christian.
In this genocide discourse, which effectively prevented
clear and ethical thinking, it became impossible to distin-
guish Kasich’s nuanced andmoral position from the blunt
moralizing of the larger strategic narrative taking shape.
This second genocide discourse, as a “bottom-up”
narrative emanating from political activists in United
States civil society that was picked up and articulated
by political elites such as Huckabee and Cruz, succeeded
in defining the terms of engagement with United States
foreign policy against Islam. The movement eventually
found a political articulation in the eventual Republi-
can nominee, and later United States president, Donald
Trump, who embraced the discourse of Muslim geno-
cides being committed against Christians, and linked ISIL,
al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah into a single genocidal
movement (Fredericks, 2016; Trump, 2017); called for a
ban on all Muslims entering the United States and imme-
diately attempted to partially enact that ban in his first
month in office (Fields, 2015); selected a National Secu-
rity Advisor who believed Islam was a political ideology
and that the United States was at war with Islam (Kaczyn-
ski, 2016); appointed a top advisor who believed the
United States had a duty to reject secularism and erad-
icate Islam from United States society while combatting
Islam overseas (Harkinson, 2016; Mallin, 2017); and un-
apologetically stated that the United States should priv-
ilege accepting Christian refugees because the second-
generation of Muslim immigrants in the United States
could become terrorists, and then rejected accepting
all refugees from Muslim countries on the grounds that
some of the Christians might be Muslims who, though
they are victims of ISIL today, would produce future dece-
dents of Muslims who would be terror threats because
theywereMuslims (Brody, 2017;Memoli, 2016). In so do-
ing, the genocide discourse of ISIL genocides established,
discursively, an image of an American political commu-
nity as a distinctly Christian community—Christian in its
values and goals, and in the stakes of its international and
domestic struggles—without having to define the con-
tent of that identity, define what it meant to be Christian
or American, or think clearly about what a “Christian” or
“American” ethics would look like in the face of the chal-
lenge of responding to genocide. The honest and inclu-
sive attempts to employ a genocide discourse that used
a Christian identity to bridge sympathy between Ameri-
cans and ISIL victims of genocide and increase the num-
ber of refugees accepted into the United States thereby
gave way, over the course of two or three years, to a
strategic discourse that brought about its very antithesis.
5. Conclusions
Politically, the strategic narratives I have termed geno-
cide discourses are highly effective in legitimizing certain
kinds of political actions—from legitimizing certain wars
to guiding decisions about which parties in local or re-
gional conflicts should be supported by powerful coun-
tries. Such narratives simultaneously cast the perpetra-
tors as evil, the victims as innocent, and prescribe exter-
nal violence as the only means of defending the good.
In the context of United States foreign policy, the effect
is to place Sunnis (or all Muslims) beyond what Helen
Fein (1993, p. 59) termed “the universe of moral obli-
gation” of a Christian American community and foreign
policy. In the context of Iraqi politics, the genocide dis-
course also reifies the sentiments of Shiite officials in the
Iraqi government who have a material interest in socially
and politicallymarginalizing Sunni groups and casting the
stakes of political struggle in Iraq in religious terms. In
both cases, the strategic narratives that deploy the con-
cept of genocide to describe the actions or identity of the
other reify themselves in a self-fulfilling prophesy, help-
ing create the social conditions that serve as evidence of
their existence (Cobb, 2013, p. 4)—evidence that the so-
cial, political, and moral constellation of the human uni-
verse really is divided along a Christian/Muslim axis (or
a Shia/Sunni axis). But it also sets in motion the kinds
of reductionist thinking that locates the criteria for eth-
ically judging responses to actions within the act that
must be judged. Because ethics presupposes the ability
tomake a choice—and genocide discourses are designed
to remove the sense that one has a choice—the genocide
discourses explored in this article push elected officials,
policy makers, and the public more generally in America
and Russia towards inserting themselves into a violent
conflict on behalf of particular parties, while casting the
American and Russian positions in conflicts as the side of
the good.
A kind of reciprocal annihilation becomes the imag-
ined solution to genocide, in so far as the total annihi-
lation of a supposedly evil social group is presented as
the only way to prevent the total annihilation of a sup-
posedly pure and innocent victim group. In the context
of the conflict in Ukraine sparked by the clandestine Rus-
sian invasion of Crimea and the Donbas region, the ar-
gument amongst Ukrainian nationalists that Soviet geno-
cides were an attempt to “Russify” Ukraine in order to
subject Ukraine to the political authority of Moscow le-
gitimizes and grounds calls to remove Russian influences
from Ukraine as a solution to Ukraine’s political and eco-
nomic problems (Motyl, 2017). Likewise, the prevarica-
tions from Moscow about Ukrainian genocides against
ethnic Russians are effective tools for conjuring up do-
mestic support for an aggressive foreign war and annex-
ing large portions of Ukraine (Motyl, 2017, p. 360).
In the context of United States politics, the genocide
discourses are operating in much the same way, calling
to mind solutions to genocides in Iraq and Syria that rely
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on reductionist and essentialist thinking about parties
in conflict. Such genocide discourses frame external vi-
olence deployed against ISIL (or Sunni Muslims, or even
all of Islam) as a regenerative force—a source of grace
in defense of the innocent—that can bring peace out
of genocide. What drops out of political discourse, and
what drops out of the movements and policies they in-
spire, is any serious conversation about the ethics and
efficacy of such interventions, or any thought about how
peace is supposed to be forged after wiping away the
totalitarian/genocidal ISIL movement. The same can be
said for Ukrainian and Russian accusations of each other
as genocidal. This is because, in eliminating the social
group that seeks to eliminate entire social groups, the
promise of peace is not believed to be located in the po-
litical and social realms of conflict. Rather, the promise of
peace itself is taken as implicit in the morally sanctioned
violence that purifies society of sources of evil.
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